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Financial instruments can help alleviate poverty through better agricultural 
water management 
Using examples of drought insurance, payment for environmental services and 
warehouse receipts, this brief paper discusses the potential roles of some new financial 
instruments to support agricultural water management in rainfed areas of developing 
countries. In so doing, we aim to raise awareness of the broader potentials for financial 
instruments to improve water productivity and so help achieve two goals: alleviation of 
poverty that is caused by the inability of individuals to manage water, and improved 
water productivity that is necessary to solve an emerging problem of global water 
scarcity. 
We discuss these issues in the following sequence. First we review the need to improve 
water productivity at both a global and individual level, highlighting the obstacles to 
improvement posed by uncertainty and risk. We then focus on a particular approach to 
pro-poor risk management using drought insurance, before examining briefly how two 
other financial instruments: payment for ecosystem services and warehouse receipts also 
contribute to improved water management. Finally we review some potentials and pitfalls 
of using the instruments.  
Need for improved agricultural water management 
Uncertainty and risk obstruct improved water management. 
Molden et al. (2003) estimate that by 2020 approximately 75% of the world’s population 
will live in areas experiencing physical or economic water scarcity. Most of these areas 
happen to be where most of the poor and food-insecure people live. It is widely accepted 
that the water productivity of agricultural production systems must increase to meet the 
demand for more food, while at the same time satisfying competing demands for 
industry, urban and environmental function.   
While many strategies exist to improve water productivity (WP), adoption rates remain 
low. The reasons are many.  Reliable, low-cost supplies of sufficient water enable high 
levels of productivity and reduce risk, so why should producers voluntarily reduce water 
inputs?  Even though society at large or river basin managers trying to allocate limited 
supplies both have a high incentive for agriculture to deplete less water, producers 
themselves have little incentive. 
These complex factors can be organized according to the types of uncertainty related to 
water productivity: 
The first is the uncertainty regarding the scale of potential benefits that might accrue from 
increased WP. Until decision makers are clear about the specific degree, timing and cost 
of potential improvement in WP, the prospects for concerted effort seem limited. Who 
stands to gain from improved WP? Who are the winners and losers in any proposed 
redistribution of the water saved? What are the risks of changing WP, for example 
through loss of ‘non-productive’ environmental flows?  
Surprisingly few detailed measurements exist of current WP on which to gauge the scope 
for improvement. Nor is it clear how variation of potential WP, which expresses the 
upper limit of gain, varies spatially. The uncertainty regarding potential benefits can be 
removed by gaining insights through continued measurement and analysis.  
The second type of uncertainty concerns the practical likelihood of increasing WP in 
relation to other factors that influence decisions taken at the management level. Farmers 
and other water managers consider a wide range of factors in making such decisions; 
unfortunately, WP per se is unlikely to be prominent amongst them. More significant are 
the perceptions of risk in relation to possible returns and the incentives and support 
structures for measures that enhance WP. 
Poverty impacts of risk  
We use drought insurance to illustrate the application of financial instruments to handle 
the intersecting interests of risk and water management. 
Agriculture is inherently risky. Exposure to risk is widely correlated with poverty (Bird et 
al., 2002).  Risk is therefore a major modifiable reason for chronic poverty. Production 
risks include climatic hazard, which of all the risks agriculture faces is perhaps the most 
difficult one for farmers to manage. Drought is the most serious threat to livelihoods 
globally, accounting for 44% of reported deaths in the period 1974-2003 (EM-DAT, 
2004). 
Droughts cause food and income insecurity through both acute effects and chronic 
secondary effects. Acute effects are immediate crop failure, which in extreme cases leads 
to hunger and even starvation. Secondary consequences of drought include increases in 
local rates of interest due to an increase in the number of households seeking credit and a 
decline in the demand for farm labor leading to a reduction in local wages due to greater 
numbers seeking off-farm employment. Livestock also suffer hunger and starvation 
leading to falling prices due to distress sales. Food prices increase coincidental with 
falling financial resources available to rural households as sources of income dry up 
(Sakurai and Reardon, 1997). Nearly 80% of farmers interviewed in Ethiopia cited 
harvest failure caused by drought and other natural hazards as the event that caused them 
most concern (Dercon, 2001). Pandey et al. (2001) revealed a huge drop in income for 
rice farmers in Orissa state in India as a result of drought. This work is substantiated 
further by experience from more recent droughts in the region.  
The mere expectation of drought is sufficient in some cases to reduce agricultural 
production, through its impact on investments that would otherwise increase productivity. 
Farmers, who are characterized predominantly as being risk-averse, are reluctant to invest 
in the face of significant uncertainty. 
Impacts of risk on agricultural water productivity 
Informal risk-coping mechanisms (table 1) that predominate in developing countries not 
only present a barrier to improved productivity but reinforce the situations which reduce 
it (Barrett et al., 2001; Brown and Churchill, 1999; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). 
They do this because firstly they reduce resource use efficiency and secondly they avoid 
investments that in the long term would increase productivity (Hazell et al., 2000; World 
Bank, 2001). For example, widespread experience from the Sahel region shows that faced 
with the possibility of drought, farmers apply fertilizer at rates well below the optimum, 
(Bationo and Mokwyunye, 1991) because the additional investment increases their loss 
should the crop fail.  
In addition to direct loss of water productivity caused by individuals risk-coping 
behaviour, knock-on effects reduce the productivity of the entire system. Hussain et al. 
(2001) point out the importance of multiplier effects, through food security and income 
generation  Informal insurance is ineffective to cope with widespread, covariate risk 
events such as drought. Repeated shocks further undermine it (Dercon, 2003). A survey 
in India found that 30% of respondents cited loss of wages, income or work as a major 
impact of a risk event (Hess, 2003a). Financial institutions are unwilling to lend to such 
borrowers precisely because of their vulnerability to drought risk and the consequential 
likelihood of default on loan repayments (Hess, 2003a). Indian banks, who lend to 
farmers in irrigated areas, are constrained by the risk of drought from extending credit to 
farmers in nonirrigated areas (Mishra, 1994). 
About 80% of the population of Ethiopia depends on rainfed agriculture for subsistence. 
Agricultural production and GDP is highly correlated with variation of rainfall around the 
average. McCarthy et al. (2004) show that, for pastoralists at least, the coping 
mechanisms of mobility and flexibility are used mainly to deal with uncertainty.  Further 
analysis suggests that climate variability, principally variations in rainfall, costs the 
economy over one third of its growth potential (World Bank 2006). The potential gains of 
improving agricultural WP under these circumstances seem substantial. Rockström 
(2003) estimates that gains in WP of 4800 km3/yr will be required from rainfed 
agriculture to meet demand in 2050.  There is some optimism that this can be achieved as 
shown by the substantial gaps between actual and potential crop yield (Rockström and 
Barron, 2003). Large gains in crop yield appear achievable in Africa through investment 
in fertilizer to correct the widespread depletion of soil nutrients, but those yield gains are 
vulnerable to even short dry spells during the ‘normal’ growing season (Christianson et 
al., 1990; Bationo, 1989).  
Drought insurance as a means of improving agricultural water management 
Farmers use a range of measures to cope with risk. Table 1 identifies informal and 
instrument-based measures of risk avoidance used in farming.  
Table 1. Risk management tools 
 
Self-insurance measures Modern risk-avoidance measures 
Crop diversification Production contracting 
Maintaining financial reserves Marketing contracting 
Reliance on off-farm employment Forward pricing 
Other off-farm income generation Futures options contracts 
Selling family assets (e.g. cattle) Leasing inputs  
Avoidance of investments in expensive processes 
such as fertilizing (especially in high-risk years) Invest in fertilizer, use long-term forecasts 
Accumulation of stocks in good years Acquiring crop and revenue insurance  
Removal of children from education to work on 
farm Custom hiring 
(Source: Wenner and Arias, 2003; Skees et al., 2001; Hess, 2003) 
Many argue that informal self-insurance measures are a barrier to poverty alleviation 
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Brown and Churchill, 1999; Barrett et al., 2001). 
Traditional risk-coping mechanisms not only sustain poverty but are believed to actually 
hinder development because risk-averse strategies generally use resources inefficiently. 
Additionally, they fail to exploit more productive investments and technologies that in 
the long term would result in more water productive systems (Hazell et al., 2000; World 
Bank, 2001). Informal measures are more widespread in developing countries because 
most of the modern risk-avoidance measures are not readily available in those countries. 
Farmers in these regions are obliged to adopt traditional informal risk-coping 
mechanisms, even though they are known to be sub-optimal.  
Insurance is a financial instrument that enables investment through transparent sharing of 
risk. Drought insurance exchanges the irregular uncertainty of large losses caused by 
drought for regular small premium payments. A rule of thumb is that the larger the 
proportional loss in assets and income, the fewer alternatives there are to recover from 
the loss (Brown and Churchill, 1999). Insurance is one of the few viable options for poor 
people to manage uncertain events that can cause large losses. Other tools that lie outside 
the scope of this article include savings, mutual plans or credit (Brown et al., 2000).  The 
reader is referred to this reference. 
Two broad principles govern insurance design. The first is that risk-sharing can only 
occur when both parties (the insurer and insured) have accurate information about a 
hazard and the likelihood of it occurring. Skees (2003) maintains that a sound weather 
insurance product is transparent and symmetrical, so eliminating both moral hazard and 
adverse selection. This has been true for over three centuries. Transparency means that 
the basis of insurance is obvious to all parties, enabling agreement about expected wins 
or losses. The conditions under which payout occurs is determined by the insurer and 
must be evident to the insured. Symmetrical means that both parties have access to 
approximately the same level of information and are agreed about the level of uncertainty 
that remains. 
The second requirement is that the risk sharing must be broad enough to avoid co-variate 
risk (the risk that all crops insured in a scheme are affected), given that major weather 
events typically have broad geographic coverage (Miranda and Glauber, 1997). 
Developing low cost drought insurance  
Weather micro-insurance has been proposed as a viable tool to help poor farmers manage 
weather risk, which translates into crop production risk. The principles behind weather 
insurance have been widely discussed (Skees et al., 2001; Bryla et al., 2003; Hess, 2003; 
Stoppa and Hess, 2003; Varangis et al., 2003). A review of the principles of the insurance 
process follows.  
The basis of insurance is an agreed estimate of hazard probability (Skees, 2003). The 
probability of occurrence of specific events must be identified and agreed by both parties 
to ensure symmetry of information. The normal method of estimating these probabilities 
is from prior events. For the purposes of crop insurance against drought in developing 
countries this faces two difficulties. Firstly, accurate historical data of loss events may 
not exist. Secondly, data may exist but not for the population being insured.  
Indices of crop yield are a relatively new method for insurance products that have been 
applied as area-average indices (Skees et al., 2001). Indemnity payments are made to 
policy-holders when the area-average yield for a particular season falls below a 
predetermined long-term area average. The index in this case is a percentage of the long-
term area average yield. Examples can be found with corn in USA, rice in India,  
livestock in Mongolia and pastures for beef production in Canada.  
Area-average indices may not be appropriate for developing countries where long and 
reliable yield data are not available (Skees et al., 2001). Moreover, in developing 
countries, yield data are normally derived from research stations, which may not be 
representative of the area as a whole. Research station yields are known to overestimate 
farmers’ yields by 30% or more (Davidson, 1965).  Furthermore, data for subsistence 
crops, and especially for farmers’ fields, are almost never available 
Weather index insurance is another relatively recent development, in which rainfall 
events, not yield, are the basis for determining indemnity payment. Historical rainfall 
data are far more widely available than crop yield data and are consequently more 
suitable as a basis for insurance in developing countries. The rainfall index expresses the 
specific rainfall events that are associated with a given level of crop loss. Crop sensitivity 
to drought incidence varies according to growth stage, precedent conditions and soil 
water storage capacity; it is therefore critical to establish the relationship between 
weather events (drought) and crop loss as accurately as possible. 
A major problem facing rainfall index insurance is basis risk (Miranda and Vedenov, 
2001; Skees et al., 2001; Turvey, 2001; World Bank, 2001; Skees, 2003). Basis risk 
occurs when the index does not represent actual loss: either the trigger is too heavy and 
fails to indemnify actual loss or payment occurs without loss. Additionally basis risk may 
occur when risk over a heterogeneous area is estimated from sparse rainfall data.  
Other financial instruments of potential to agricultural water management 
Payment for Ecosystem Services 
Interest is increasing in the concept of payments for ecosystem services (PES). PES exists 
in a diverse array of forms as instruments to reward or compensate people who modify 
the environment in ways that are deemed beneficial (Figure 1). Land users can modify 
water flow or water quality, preserve biodiversity or modify storage capacity of (for 
example) soil carbon. Projects have already been initiated in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. The nature of PES seems particularly well suited to agricultural water 
management, since it takes advantage of a fundamental feature of collective water 
management: people within a catchment system are connected physically through the 
water they share, but are often poorly connected institutionally in ways which enable 
improved management of the common resource. 
By definition, PES schemes tend to cover large geographical areas. Also, they are likely 
to exchange hydrological services that may be difficult to estimate. The concept is 
intuitively appealing but the scale of interest currently appears to exceed the scale of 
activity on the ground. Swallow (2006) summarizes the main difficulties as: 
• Uncertainties concerning the beneficiaries: For example, is the purpose to 
improve ecosystem function or to effect local improvements in well-being?  
• Compensation and rewards in relation to rights, duties and uncertainties. How 
inclusive is the scheme? How much basis risk remains in the scheme from un-
accounted events? 
• Basis of agreement: outcomes, actions, plans and objectives. What is the design 
of the payment system, triggers, penalties, dispute resolution mechanisms? 
• Uncertainties introduced by spatial and temporal variability and extent. How are 
intrinsic variations handled? What scope is there for modification of the 
agreement? 
• Governance and institutions: Who manages the scheme? What is the appropriate 
role of state government, and what are the effects of changes in the policy and 
legal environment?  
• Uncertainties of past and future trends. The value of a service will be affected by 
climate change and factors such as El Niño, demographic trends and market 
shifts. What are the long term benefits? 
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3 Network building: A third function is to provide transparency and stability to promote 
the function of networks. While insurance relies on parties independent of the water use 
‘supply chain’ to share risk, the instruments of PES and WR build connectivity between 
actors to improve the stability and certainty of transaction.  
Pitfalls  
Coulter (2005), Skees et al., (2001) and others provide cautionary analysis of many 
potential pitfalls with WR and insurance. Swallow (2006) provides analysis of the 
features that tend to reduce the attractiveness of PES. We attempt here to organize pre-
conditions for success according to the three I’s: incentive; infrastructure and institutions. 
Incentive: 
The WR instrument described by Tabo et al. (2005) enables investment that is driven by 
the market for grain, without which credit may need to be subsidised below the level that 
is attractive to private banks. Coulter (2005) identifies the risks to private-sector based 
attempts to stabilise prices through WR, the alternatives to which are state intervention, 
and worse, by large scale public procurement.  
Incentives for individuals and private companies to engage in drought insurance can be 
reduced by state intervention. Insurance has, to date, had an unhappy history on account 
of market distortions, political interference and corruption, with most failing to cover the 
costs of payouts (Hazell, 1992). Basis risk of insurance products can be reduced by 
maximising the accuracy of risk estimation. An insurance product will not be attractive to 
potential customers if they think that the basis risk is too high (Skees et al., 2001). 
Most crop-insurance schemes in the past have been fatally damaged by an attempt to 
cover multiple perils or all-risks (Skees et al., 2001). This has meant that virtually any 
cause of crop failure was insured, resulting in excessive indemnity payments. Because 
private insurance companies will not insure risks that are widely correlated, such as 
multiple crops, these schemes were either fully publicly-owned or had large government 
subsidies. Moreover, because they were all- or multiple-risk they incurred substantial 
moral hazard in which the insured has no incentive to take all prudent care to avoid crop 
losses.  
Infrastructure: 
Infrastructure requirements include physical infrastructure and human capital. Economies 
of scale seem to be an essential feature of success. Coulter (2005) observes that WR 
schemes started more quickly when they were initiated by large, well-capitalized farmers, 
close to large-scale warehouse and milling capacity, and supported by banks that were 
willing to provide credit. Capacity building was an essential part of the WR scheme 
described by Tabo et al., (2005), to establish a large body of people familiar with the 
concepts and function of the WR system. Insurance depends on geographical scope to 
overcome dangers of covariate risk, through re-insurance or catastrophe bonds (known as 
CAT bonds, Skees, 2003). Weather insurance also may require infrastructure of 
monitoring stations. WR requires transportation infrastructure; insurance requires 
communication infrastructure to maintain transparency and information symmetry.  
Institutions: 
Given that deep political involvement seems to be more often unhelpful than helpful to 
the operation of financial instruments, Coulter (2005) comments on the value of a 
‘minimally supportive policy environment’, to enable the private sector to operate 
effectively.  Such an environment would provide efficient and trustworthy WR systems. 
Insurance has a very long history of regulation, effectively strengthened further by the 
need for re-insurance, to support local or regional insurers. The boundary between 
insurance and credit institutions is at times being blurred, and a debate is running about 
the merits and dangers of close association between micro-financiers and insurers. In 
practice, insurance is also reliant on observations from trusted independent institutions.  
Conclusions: 
Agricultural water management is plagued by uncertainties caused by unmanaged 
variations within farming systems. Uncertainties constrain the livelihood that people gain 
from agricultural water management, particularly in rainfed systems operating in 
marginal environments. Relative loss occurs because farmers, and especially poor 
farmers, are unable to make investments in the face of unmanaged risk. Investments 
include fertilizer, new seed and water infrastructure are necessary to increase 
productivity, which underwrites the accumulation of biological and financial capital. 
Knock-on effects reduce the activity of the entire farming system. A consequence of 
limitations within the farming system is the constraint on improving water productivity, 
which is necessary to meet the challenge of global water scarcity.  
Financial instruments such as insurance, warrantage or payments for ecosystem services 
reduce the constraining uncertainty through counter-cyclic exchanges between actors in 
ways that are agreed to be mutually beneficial. The basis of these instruments is 
information about the likelihood of future events that increase certainty and help build 
trust.  
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